Category Archives: Supreme Court

Can civil rights agencies help employees beat arbitration clauses?

Posted on August 9, 2018 by Jon Rehm

If confirmed, will Washington Nationals superfan Brett Kavanaugh just call balls and strikes when it comes to workplace justice issues?

The Lincoln Commission on Human Rights (LCHR) entered an award last month of $175,000 on behalf of a man who they found was discriminated against based on nationality and age.

While a six-figure judgment in favor of an employee in Lincoln is newsworthy in and of itself, the procedural back story of the case should be just as interesting to lawyers and observers of the legal system in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.

A federal judge overruled the employer’s motion to compel arbitration in the case. In a memorandum recommending the motion to compel arbitration be overruled a federal magistrate cited to the 2002 Supreme Court case, EEOC v. The Waffle House to hold that the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights was not a party to arbitration agreement and was free to pursue relief on behalf of the employee. The memorandum cited Iowa and Massachusetts cases applying Waffle House to state anti-discrimination agencies to find it applicable to the LCHR.

The ability of employees to use civil rights agencies as an end run around arbitration clauses, has taken new importance in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent Epic decision was which provided even more ability for employers to enforce arbitration agreements.

But there are some potential barriers for employees who wish to have an anti-discrimination agency pursue a discrimination claim on their behalf.

The most practical barrier is the lack of resources of civil rights agencies. In Nebraska, an employee has to wait several months before an investigator is assigned to their claim. This means that evidence gets spoiled and overworked investigators may not be as willing to pursue a case because of workload concerns. Without good evidence an agency is not going to pursue a claim on behalf of an employee in the public hearing process.

The inadequate funding of administrative agencies stems from a general hostility that many conservatives have towards the so-called “administrative state” or executive agencies that generally regulate the economy. (These same folks are deferential to executive agencies that comprise the national security state and law enforcement) This hostility is also evidenced in judicial skepticism of administrative agencies. This skepticism was on display from the Supreme Court in the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision. In Masterpiece the court found that comments made by a state human rights commissioner were sufficient evidence of bias to overturn a decision finding a business owner who refused to bake a cake for a gay wedding had committed illegal discrimination. I would expect more of that heightened scrutiny of decisions made by civil rights agencies in the future.

Finally, Waffle House may not remain controlling law. Waffle House was decided by a relatively narrow 6-3 decision with Justice Clarence Thomas writing the dissenting opinion. Legal journalist Ian Millhiser has deemed Thomas to be the most influential justice because of his long record of dissenting and concurring opinions that are increasingly being adopted as law due to changes in the composition of the court.

Since Waffle House was decided in 2002, the Supreme Court has added Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito. Gorsuch is noted for his particular hostility to administrative agencies. Supreme Court nominee and DC Circuit Court Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s views on administrative agencies allegedly aren’t as strident as those of his fellow Georgetown Prep alum, Neil Gorsuch. But an employer looking to overturn the Waffle House decision may find a friendly audience with a five-justice majority comprising Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.

Appellate courts aren’t going to preserve workers’ compensation

Posted on July 5, 2018 by Jon Rehm

The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a “reform” of New York workers’ compensation laws made by Liberty Mutual

Employee advocates, me included, are still trying to process just how bad this latest session of the Supreme Court was for workers. There were bad decisions in wage and hour, whistleblower, forced arbitation and labor law. In lower profile decisions, the court may have encroached into how work injury cases are litigated and rejected a constitutional challenge to state level reforms.

The Supreme Court may have handed employers/insurers a way to mount constitutuonal challneges to some state workers’ compensation laws in Lucia v. SEC. (Lucia is of more immediate concerns to Longshore and FECA practitioners who have their cases heard by ALJs ). In many states, like Iowa, workers’ compensation cases are heard by Administrative Law Judges that are hired as civil servants rather than appointed by the Executive. SEC v. Lucia could help employers/insurers to make persuasive appointments clause arguments under state constitutions that such arrangements are unconstitutional.

Advocates for injured workers have taken some solace in a string of good outcomes in front of state courts in Kansas, Pennslyvania, O klahoma, Florida and Alabama. But even that run of state-level wins has come to a halt for now.

The Oklahoma Supreme court rejected a constitutional challenge to Oklahoma’s mandated use of American Medical Association Guides (AMA Guides) to Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition. Thomas Robinson pointed out the case was distinguishable from a Pennsylvania case strking down a law mandating the use of the “latest” guides because the Oklahoma legislature expressly adopted the AMA 6th to determine how they would pay scheudled member disability.

Oklahoma isn’t the only state where consitutional challenges to anti-workers changes to workers’ compensation laws have failed recently. The Supreme Court denied certiorari — refused to hear an appeal — from a New York Court of Appeals decision overruling a contracts clause and takings clause challenge to New York’s workers’ compensation law by workers’ compensation insurer, Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual was challenging the end of employer contributions to New York’s Special Fund for Reopened Cases that was part of reforms to New York’s workers’ compensation laws made in 2013. The Fund for Reopened cases allows employees to be compensated for cases where claims were at least 7 years old and no benefits had been paid for three years. Essentially the Fund ensures that the costs of old work injuries don’t get unfairly shifted on to workers and other payors. By abolishing the employer contribution, New York state essentially stuck workers’ compensation insurers with the cost of old injuries without being compensated by employers.

Essentially the Supreme Court refused to consider overturning state-level workers’ compensation reform based on the federal constitution. I think there is some consolation in the fact that the successful challenges to workers’ compensation were made on due process and equal protection grounds, while the unsuccessful New York challenge was based on the takings and contract clause. Historically the contracts clause was used to strike down pro-worker laws enacted by states starting in the late 19^th century. (I also find some personal consolation that the successful constitutional challenges to comp reform have been mounted by plaintiff’s lawyers from small firms, while the New York challenge was unsuccessfully argued by a former United States Solicitor General.)

The demise of the Fund for Reopened Cases was prompted by an earlier reform that abolished the Second Injury Fund in New York because insurers pushed former Second Injury Fund cases into the Fund for Reopened Cases. Second Injury Funds were intended to encourage hiring of injured employees by ensuring that new employers were not stuck with the entire cost of aggravation of old injury by a previously injured worker. New York is far from the only state that has abolished second injury funds. Insurance thought-leader types seem to believe that Second Injury Funds aren’t necessary because of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Anyone with any experience litigating ADA cases for employees would beg to differ.

Fundamentally, the failed New York and Oklahoma court challenges are illustrative of disturbing larger trends in the arena of workers’ compensation. First, constitutional challenges are not a foolproof method of defeating workers’ compensation reform. Secondly even when court challenges do succeed they represent the inverse of the conditions that made workers’ compensation laws possible. Workers’ compensation laws were enacted by legislatures in the face of a court systems that as a whole was either indifferent or hostile to the interests of workers hurt on the job. Now advocates for injured workers look to courts for relief from hostile legislatures. Looking to state appellate courts as an antidote to workers’ compensation reform may become less of an option as anti-worker Governors appoint anti-worker judges. Ensuring the workers’ compensation system protects injured workers will probably depend on the same type of mass politics that lead to the enactment of workers’ compensation laws. That kind of politics is probably beyond the scope of the relative small number of attorneys who represent injured employees, but those of who represent injured workers’ need to ally with broader worker movements and make sure that workers’ compensation is a high priority for other worker advocates.

Three ways to make sense of Masterpiece Cakeshop

Posted on June 14, 2018 by Jon Rehm

The Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop was not as harmful to LGBT rights or civil rights laws in general as feared. In fact, Masterpiece was cited by the Arizona Court of Appeals in upholding a Phoenix municipal ordinance prohibiting LGBT discrimination in public accommodation.

But court watchers were left scratching their collective heads by the mixed signals sent by the court. Given a week to digest the decision and read over the commentary, I think Masterpiece is understandable in the broader context of other decisions made by the Roberts court. I think three trends explain Masterpiece: 1) The Court’s favor of protected status over protected activity) 2 skepticism of the “administrative state” and 3) the use of federal supremacy by the court to rein in progressive-leaning states and cities.

Protected Status > Protected Activity

Sexual orientation and gender identity are considered a type of protected class. Sometimes theses these statuses are protected expressly, like they are in state and municipal laws, or they are covered by sex as held by many federal courts. Civil rights laws protect everyone based on various protected statuses such as race, nationality, religion, sex, disability and age. Everybody is covered by multiple protected classes. Protected class discrimination is fairly non-controversial because most people agree that someone should not be discriminated against based on immutable traits like race or sex. Sexual orientation and gender identity are just additional protected classes that would apply some people.

This isn’t to say that LGBT rights are universally accepted. The fact there are so many litigated cases, like Masterpiece, based on direct evidence of discrimination should be proof of that statement. But even in conservative-leaning states like Nebraska, business interests have pushed to expand anti-discrimination laws to LGBT individuals in an effort to have cities and states be seen as “open for business”. That’s part of the reason that Omaha, like Phoenix, has a municipal ordinance prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The Materpiece decision could be very persusasive to a Nebraska court hearing a challenge to Omaha’s laws prohibting discrimination agains the LGBT community.

Business looks less favorably upon protected activities than protected statuses. These are activities that individuals cannot be sanctioned for or retaliated against for engaging. From a business point of view the most problematic problematic activity is engaging in unionization or striking. Striking has re-emerged as a popular tactic for workers in the wake of teachers strikes and a possible strike by UPS drivers. The Supreme Court generally takes a business-friendly view on protected activity. In Epic, the court took a narrow view of what constituted protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act. Earlier this term, in Somers v. DRT, the court narrowed the definition of a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank. The split between how the court treats protected activities and protected statuses became apparent to me in 2013 when the court decided the landmark LGBT civil rights case Windsor in the same term they decided Nassar which raised the burden of proof for employees in Title VII retaliation cases. The same split between protected activity and protected activity is apparent in 2018 with Epic and Somers contrasted with Masterpiece.

Dislike of the Administrative State

The reason why Jack Phillips “won” Masterpiece was because of negative comments about religion made by a lone commissioner on the Colorado Commission on Human Rights. Phillips was being civilly charged by state administrative agency. The Roberts court, Justices Gorsuch, Thomas and Alito in particular, are skeptical of the role of administrative agencies on separation of powers grounds. That skepticism was evidenced by Justice Gorsuch’s comments about the National Labor Relations Board in Epic. ThIS terrm the court also heard what could be a close case about whether the Securities and Exchange Commission can use Administrative Law Judges to punish misconduct in the securities industry that could have broad — if not disruptive — implcations. If nothing else, Masterpiece is a bench slap to an administrative agency.

I also believe that Masterpiece could have a chilling effect on state and local human rights commissions. I have served on the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights since 2014. Even before Masterpiece was decided, commissioners were given a memo describing the concerns expressed by Justice Kennedy in oral arguments in Masterpiece about the comments made by the Colorado Civil Rights Commissioner. Civil rights commissioners often engage in spirted discussions about what constitutes unlawful discrimination in a particular case. It would be unfortunate if Masterpiece lead commissioners to self-censor over fears that those comments could be used by the parties they believe could be engaged in unlawful discrimination.

Federal supremacy over states and cities

Jack Phillips succeeded in making a first amendment argument that the Colorado Commission on Civil Rights violated his freedom of religion by making impermissible comments about his religion. Phillips resorted to federal law to strike down a decision made by the state agency of a progressive-leaning state. Much of the arbitration case law that supported the Epic decision was based on the Federal supremacy of the Federal Arbitration Act over state laws that prohibited arbitration. Many of these state laws were passed by “blue” states such as California. By overruling a decision made by the Colorado Commssion on Civil Rights, the Roberts court was able to assert some measure of federal supremacy over a progressive-leaning state.

A truly Epic failure for workers

Posted on June 4, 2018 by Jon Rehm

He just turned 50 last year…

Free speech in the workplace has been discussed heatedly in the wake of the cancellation of “Roseanne”and a new rule prohibiting NFL players from kneeling during the national anthem. Parties on both sides in the culutrue war have argued that employees don’t have freedom of the speech on the job. While that is generally true, the National Labor Relations Act gives employees some rights of speech and associationon the job. But a recent Supreme Court case could have paired back those rights.

In Epic Systems v. Lewis the United States Supreme court held in a 5-4 decision that neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act prevents enforcement of arbitration clauses that preclude class or collective actions against employers by their employees.

As many commentators and the dissent pointed out, the Epic decision will make it more difficult for workers to band together to address wage and hour violations. Individually, even with attorney fees available, it is not economical for employees to pursue individual cases of wage theft if those individual cases amount to a relatively small amount. An example of such a case were the so-called “donning and doffing” cases pursued against various meat packing plants in the Midwest.

Employers have won some major victories in the area of wage and hour law this Supreme Court term. Epic follows on the heels of a decision making it easier for employers to prove they are exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act

But Epic could impact labor and employment law beyond just wage and hour law. Here are a few ways Epic could impact more than just wage and hour law. This list is not inclusive and Epic is probably worth more discussion, but I wanted to discuss the broader implications of this case and bring up lesser discussed but important implications of this case.

What is a protected concerted activity?

The National Labor Relations Act protects protected concerted activity for the mutual aid of co-workers that goes to the terms and conditions of employment. The employees argued that participating in a collective action case under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the five Justice majority, disagreed. Gorsuch wrote that the NLRA only covered activities that employees do for themselves, not class action litigation. What concerned me more, was Gorsuch’s use of a “canon”of statutory construction to hold that seemingly broad language in the NLRA about it employees being able to engage in collective activity for “mutual aid and protection” only applied to forming labor unions and other activities related to formal collective bargaining.

This conclusion concerned me because I have long advocated for non-unionized employees to engage in collective self-help on the job to address issues like bullying or even accommodation of a disability. But, as the dissent points out, association rights on the job are also protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) NLGA expressly provides for a right to self-organization among employees. Though the Epic court rejected NLGA as a basis for overcoming an arbitration clause, it’s broader language could still be the basis for workplace speech and assocation rights than a paired down NLRA.

That Norris-LaGuardia would serve as backstop for employee association rights would assume the Roberts/Gorsuch court is merely following some rules of statutory construction rather than imposing their own economic preferences into the law. That might not be a fair assumption. The Federal Arbitration Act explicitly excludes employment contracts from coverage. In 2001, the Supreme Court limited that exclusion from workers in the transportation industry. Epic would appear to further limit that exclusion in contradiction to plain and clear statutory language to the contrary.

Can Epic be made to benefit workers?

Epic may benefit some employees. One impetus behind using arbitration clauses to prevent class action claims is to defeat class action claims on retirement plans under ERISA. However ERISA also governs short-term and long- term disability policies. Currently, short-term and long-term disability policies very difficult to win because courts defer to insurers on how the plans are interpreted. Some employee-benefit attorneys believe that employees will have a better chance of disability claims in arbitration. Union-side labor lawyer, Moshe Marvit has also speculated that Epic might make it easier for employees to form unions.

Many management-side attorneys are also skeptical of arbitration which could also prevent employers from adopting arbitration clauses.

Constitutional perspectives

So how is it that the Supreme Court can ignore seemingly plain language about the Federal Arbitration Act not applying to employment disputes? The Circuit City decision from 2001, provides one clue. In Circuit City the Supreme Court used a narrow interpretation of interstate commerce to hold that the FAA only applies to transportation employees. This holding is consistent with other holdings from the Rehnquist and Roberts courts that limit that power of the federal government to regulate through the commerce clause. (12)

Though Epic doesn’t discuss state police powers under the 10^th Amendment much of the case law relied upon in Epic has to do with how the FAA pre-empts state laws preventing arbitration in certain cases. Essentially the so-called “contracts clause” which prevents laws that impair the obligation of contract. This includes state laws enacted under 10^th Amendment police powers. The Supreme Court took up a contracts clause case, Sveen v. Melin, this term. That case could also have implications in the world of employment law depending on the language of the decision and any possible concurring opinions from the likes of Justices Gorsuch, Alito or Thomas.

Gorsuch, Chevron and Workplace Law

Posted on February 9, 2017 by Jon Rehm

Judge Gorsuch

Employers and their attorneys are widely hailing President Trump’s nomination of 10^th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court. Part of the reason that management-side lawyers are praising Gorsuch is his position on Chevron deference. Gorsuch’s views on Chevron could affect how workplace laws are interpreted and how they apply to workers.

Chevron deference is a legal rule that a court will give the benefit of the doubt about the interpretation of the law to how the executive agency charged with enforcing that law understands the law. Gorsuch has criticized Chevron on separation of powers basis, stating that Chevron deference gives too much power to the executive branch at the expense of the legislative and judiciary branches. Recently, government agencies have been interpreting employment laws in a way that is more favorable toward employees. Recent rules issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act are a prime example.

Many workers who get hurt on the job are told that they must come back to work with no restrictions. Chevron deference could be a powerful legal tool for workers faced with such policies. The new EEOC regulations on the ADA outlaw 100-percent-healed policies or policies that require plaintiffs to return to work without restrictions. In the EEOC guidance on the issue, the EEOC cites Kaufman v. Peterson Health Care VII, LLC 769 F. 3d 958 (7^th Cir. 2014) as an example of policies that they believe to be unlawful under ADAAA. This case represents a subtle but real shift from current 8^th Circuit law as stated in Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, 188 F. 3d 949, 951-952 (8^th Cir. 1999) where the 8^th Circuit joined other federal circuits that held that failure to engage in an interactive process in accommodating a disability was not per se discrimination, and that there was no duty to engage in the interactive process. The EEOC’s interpretations of the new regulations still require that a plaintiff be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.

But as indicated by Kaufman, courts may be less likely to dismiss cases before trial, or in legal terminology, to grant summary judgment, on the issue of whether a plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation if the defendant does not engage in an interactive process or summarily decides that an employee should not be allowed to return without restrictions.

The fact that there is a split between regional appellate courts, a so-called circuit split, over “100 percent healed” policies increases the chances that the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether 100-percent-healed policies violate the ADA. Another issue where there is a circuit split that the U.S. Supreme Court will decide is the legality of mandatory arbitration clauses in employment agreements.

Many workers unwittingly give up their rights to have employment-law disputes heard in court when they agree to mandatory arbitration clauses as a term of employment. In D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.B. No 184 (2012) the National Labor Relations Board ruled that mandatory arbitration clauses prohibited Fair Labor Standards Act collective action cases because they interfered with protected concerted activity under 29 U.S.C. §157 and 29 U.S.C. § 158. In Lewis v. Epic Systems, 823 F. 3d 1147, 1154 (7^th Cir. 2016), the 7^th Circuit struck down a mandatory arbitration clause partly based on giving Chevron deference to the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton. The 9^th Circuit agreed with the 7^th Circuit in Morris v. Ernst and Young, LLP, No 13-16599 (Aug. 22, 2016). Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the 8^th Circuit disagreed with the D.R. Horton decision in Owen v. Bristol Care, 702 F. 3d 1050 (8^th Cir. 2013).

If confirmed, Gorsuch would be unlikely to give much weight to the opinions of the EEOC or NLRB in interpreting employment laws. Chevron deference is an unpopular concept with pro-business conservatives. Recently, the GOP-controlled House of Representatives passed legislation that, if enacted, would abolish Chevron deference.

Conversely, Chevron deference is a popular concept with progressive employee and civil-rights advocates, as it allowed the Obama administration to expand employee protections in the face of a hostile Congress. But with the advent of the Trump administration and his immigration policies, progressives have a newfound appreciation for separation of powers.

Also, employee advocates probably will not like many of the new rules and regulations issued by Trump appointees such as Labor Secretary nominee Larry Puzder. A prospective abolition of Chevron could be helpful to challenging rules made by a Trump administration. An example from the last Republican administration is instructive. In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) gave Chevron deference to Bush administration rules to exclude home health aides from coverage under the FLSA. It was nine years later that the rule was overturned, giving Chevron deference to Obama administration rules regarding home health aides and the FLSA.

Counterclaims in Nebraska Workers’ Compensation

Posted on November 14, 2016 by Brody Ockander

Earlier this year, the Nebraska Supreme Court struck down the ability of defendant-employers to file counterclaims in workers’ compensation cases. See Interiano-Lopez v. Tyson Fresh Meats, 294 Neb. 586 (2016).

What does this mean for workers?

The biggest advantage this decision has for workers is the fact that a worker may dismiss a case at any time without prejudice under § 48-177 without having to worry about a counterclaim still hanging out there. In other words, this decision could prevent employers from forcing a trial before plaintiff is ready or if plaintiff wants to wait for trial until after the she or he is done treating.

Another benefit of this recent decision might be a little less obvious. Under Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a worker may be able to have workers’ compensation coverage in multiple states for the same accident/injury. The reason this is important with respect to counterclaims is that the injured worker now has the ability to dismiss the lawsuit to allow for potentially more-favorable benefits in another state, while still maintaining the option to return to Nebraska jurisdiction at a later date if necessary.

Discrimination: Municipal Human-Rights Commissions Another Option for Charges

Posted on June 5, 2014 by Jon Rehm

When a prospective client calls in with a potential employment discrimination question, one of the questions I always ask is, “What city or town do you work in?” The reason I ask this question is because many larger cities in the states where we practice, such as Omaha, Lincoln and Des Moines, have separate municipal fair-employment acts that cover more employees than are covered under state or federal law.

State and federal fair-employment statutes generally need at least 15 or 20 employees for an employer to be covered by those laws. However, in Des Moines and Lincoln, an employer only needs to have four employees to be covered under those cities’ human-rights ordinances. In Omaha, an employer only needs six employees to be covered by their fair-employment ordinance.

Also, the City of Omaha explicitly covers sexual orientation under the fair-employment ordinance. Sexual-orientation discrimination is not explicitly prohibited by Nebraska or federal law. It is my belief that sexual-orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination that is already covered under Title VII and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act. However, my opinions as to what I think the law is and what the law is are two different matters. If you are an Omaha resident who feels you were discriminated against because of your sexual orientation, you would be much more certain to have your claim of discrimination heard on the merits by pursuing a claim under the Omaha Human Rights Ordinance. While I would be willing to filing a sexual-orientation discrimination case under Nebraska law, any potential clients need to know that such a case would be a test case, and as such, this case would be under tremendous scrutiny from judges.

The drawback to filing discrimination cases under the Lincoln and Omaha municipal ordinances is that there is less opportunity for monetary award if you are successful in winning your case than you would have under state or federal law. However, some remedy for your discrimination is better than no remedy for your discrimination.

Can I Get Fired For Filing Bankruptcy?

Posted on April 21, 2014 by Jon Rehm

Low and middle income people are the last people to benefit from any economic recovery. For many economic recovery means a return to work the opportunity to put their household finances in order with steady income provided by a job. Unfortunately unpaid debts often mean that employees get garnished or even having to file bankruptcy.

Congress intended for bankruptcy to allow for people to get a fresh start so they prohibited discrimination based on bankruptcy and even let employees sue employers for such discrimination. But this law is not as strong as other laws prohibiting discrimination on factors such as race or sex for two reasons.

First of all, your status as a debtor in bankruptcy must by the sole cause of job loss. Discrimination is difficult enough to prove already under either a motivating factor or proximate cause standard, sole cause is more exacting than even the difficult proximate cause standard. If your employer has any other legitimate reason to fire you besides your bankruptcy, then a court will likely find the termination was lawful. The only way for an employee to preserve any type of discrimination case is not to give the employee a reason to terminate them because of their poor performance , attendance or poor attitude. But even good employees can get fired legitimate reasons such as restructuring and economic reasons.

Secondly most courts do not believe that bankruptcy discrimination prohibits employers from failing to hire employees based on bankruptcy.

Title VII and most state anti-discrimination laws state that a failure to hire based on certain protected categories is unlawful activity.

Finally in any discrimination claim, the employer needs to be aware of your protected status. In a bankruptcy discrimination case this means that your employer had to have known about your bankruptcy status prior to firing you. Some employees get fired because employer doesn’t want to deal with a garnishment. Most people, me included, think that such an action is wrong or unfair. But unless your employer knows that garnishment is linked to your bankruptcy status, then firing you based on that garnishment is legal — unless the garnishment is a cover or pre-text for another unlawful reason.

I would encourage anyone reading this post to contact their U.S. Senator or Congressperson and ask them to change the bankruptcy discrimination statute to mirror other federal anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII.

Workers' Compensation Watch

Published by Rehm, Bennett, Moore & Rehm

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Category Archives: Supreme Court

Can civil rights agencies help employees beat arbitration clauses?

Appellate courts aren’t going to preserve workers’ compensation

Three ways to make sense of Masterpiece Cakeshop

A truly Epic failure for workers

Gorsuch, Chevron and Workplace Law

Counterclaims in Nebraska Workers’ Compensation

Discrimination: Municipal Human-Rights Commissions Another Option for Charges

Can I Get Fired For Filing Bankruptcy?

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